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4.1  Introduction 
The world trading system seems to be moving, not just to a system of re- 
gional free trade areas (FTAs) but to a system of large continental groupings. 
In Europe, the European Union (formerly the European Community) removed 
internal barriers in  1992 and admitted three new members in 1994, bringing 
the total to fifteen. In December  1994, the leaders of  Western Hemisphere 
countries met in Miami and agreed to form an FTA for the Americas. In East 
Asia, despite a relative paucity of  explicit preferential trading arrangements, 
one also hears of the emergence of an implicit Japan-centered trade bloc. 
This paper seeks to investigate three questions. According to bilateral trade 
data, is the world indeed breaking up into a small number of  continental trade 
blocs? In theory, is a small number of continental blocs good or bad for world 
welfare? The answer to the second question is that it depends on parameter 
values. Thus we also make an  attempt  to examine the following question: 
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for actual parameter values, is the current pattern of regionalization  welfare- 
promoting or welfare-reducing? 
Paul Krugman has helped to focus the recent debate on the welfare implica- 
tions of regional trade blocs. He has, however, supplied equally clever argu- 
ments on both sides. In his first contribution (Krugman 1991a), he argued that 
a small number of trade blocs tends to be welfare-reducing, relative to the case 
when every country charges a common tariff against all other countries. In the 
latter case, the distortions introduced relative to global free trade are relatively 
small. For plausible parameter values, three regional blocs turned out to be the 
worst outcome for the world. This is a worrisome conclusion since this is pre- 
cisely the direction toward which many observers think the world is moving. 
Krugman’s second contribution  (1991b) included a simple argument for a 
diametrically  opposite  conclusion.  If  transportation  costs are very high  be- 
tween continents, then regional trade blocs, if they are formed along continen- 
tal lines, must be welfare-improving.  The intuition  is simple. With prohibi- 
tively high intercontinental  transport  costs, trade takes place mainly among 
countries on the same continents even in the absence of trade blocs. Therefore, 
the case for regional blocs that eliminate tariffs among countries in the same 
continents (“natural blocs” in Krugman’s terminology) is the same as the stan- 
dard case for global free trade. Such natural blocs are contrasted with “unnatu- 
ral blocs,” free trade agreements between individual countries in different con- 
tinents, which are less likely to be welfare-improving.’ 
Each of these two arguments is valid within its own assumptions. The first 
argument assumes zero transport cost. The second argument relies on a prohib- 
itively high intercontinental transport cost. The world is somewhere between 
these two extremes. In order to investigate the welfare implication of the cur- 
rent pattern of trade regionalization, we develop a more general model that can 
handle intermediate cases. We identify conditions under which trade blocs are 
welfare-reducing, even when formed along continental lines. 
With the more general model, we also investigate whether a particular aspect 
of  article XXIV of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is sensi- 
ble.  Under this rule, countries  that want to form a regional trade bloc must 
eliminate all barriers among themselves. (There are other restrictions as well: 
the members must not raise barriers against nonmembers.) In our model, how- 
ever, we find that partial liberalization within a regional bloc is generally better 
than 100 percent liberalization, in contrast to the article XXIV provision. 
The welfare implication of continental blocs depends on the values of some 
crucial parameters. In the final part of the paper, we make an attempt-perhaps 
best described as illustrative-to  extract estimates of the real-world counter- 
parts of these key parameters,  particularly  the magnitude of transport costs. 
1. It should be noted that the idea of proximity as a desideratum for successful FTAs,  on the 
grounds that it would minimize the amount of trade diversion, was not entirely new with Krugman. 
(See Balassa 1987,44;  and Wonnacott and Lutz 1989). The leading opponent to the idea is Bhag- 
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The resulting estimates suggest that the current pattern of trade blocs features 
a degree of regional preferences that is likely to exceed what can be justified 
on  “natural”  geographic  grounds.  We  propose  the  term  “supernatural”  for 
blocs that reduce economic welfare in this way. 
Most of  our conclusions regarding economic welfare presume worldwide 
symmetry. We look at the consequences of a worldwide regime that allows 
continental FTAs to form everywhere, not at the consequences of forming a 
single FTA with trade policies in the rest of the world taken as given. Many 
other possible considerations, in addition to asymmetry, are omitted from the 
analysis as well. For example, we focus only on the static economic effects. 
4.2  Are Continental Trade Blocs Forming? 
It may appear obvious that world trade is increasingly regionalized. A popu- 
lar statistic to look at is intraregional trade as a percentage of the region’s total 
trade. Table 4.1  shows that  intraregional  trade  shares  increased during the 
1980s in each of three major parts of the world: from 54 percent to 60 percent 
in Europe, from 23 percent to 29 percent in East Asia, and (less strikingly) 
from 27 percent to 29 percent in the Western Hemisphere. 
Such statistics are ill-suited, however, for the purpose of examining the de- 
gree of regional bias in trade policy. There are many factors that may contribute 
to the spatial distribution of trade. First, neighboring countries tend to trade 
more with each other. Second, large countries tend to trade more, and faster- 
growing economies tend to increase their mutual trade volume at a faster pace. 
Hence, the observed increasing share of  intra-Asia trade, for example, could 
be entirely due to the region’s above-average growth rate, with no explicit or 
implicit trade bloc in formation. A more useful way to detect the effectiveness 
of an existing trade bloc is to see whether trade among a given group of coun- 
tries is unusually high after controlling for factors that naturally contribute to 
the volume of trade. 
4.2.1  The Gravity Model of Bilateral Trade 
The natural empirical framework for studying bilateral trade is the gravity 
model, which offers a systematic way  to measure what patterns of bilateral 
trade are normal around the world. The simplest specification says that trade 
between two countries is proportionate to the product of their GDPs and in- 
versely related to the distance between  them, by  analogy to the formula for 
Table 4.1  Intraregional Trade Shares (%) 
1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1987  1990 
East Asia  .I99  ,198  ,212  ,229  ,256  ,263  .293 
Western Hemisphere  ,315  .311  ,309  ,272  .310  ,279  ,286 
Western Europe  ,502  ,532  ,524  ,538  ,548  ,601  ,602 94  Jeffrey A. Frankel, Ernest0 Stein, and Shang-Jin Wei 
gravitational attraction between two bodies. A dummy variable can be added 
to represent when both countries in a given pair belong to the same regional 
grouping. We can then see how much of the trade within each region can be 
attributed to a special regional effect. 
The gravity model has a fairly long history and fits the data remarkably well 
empirically, though its theoretical foundations have hitherto been considered 
limited.*  Earlier work by Anderson (1979) and other papers surveyed by Deard- 
orff (1984, 503-6)  have provided a partial foundation for the approach. Spe- 
cifically, the idea that bilateral trade depends on the product of GDPs can be 
justified by the modern theory of trade under imperfect competition, as shown 
in recent work by Helpman (1987) and Helpman and Krugman (1985, section 
1.5).3 
Some recent papers that apply the gravity model to trade-bloc issues (e.g., 
Frankel  1993 and Frankel and Wei  1994, which focus on East Asia, among 
others) are incapable of distinguishing between regional biases reflecting dis- 
criminatory trade policies, and those that might derive from historical, politi- 
cal, cultural, and linguistic ties. In this paper, we include terms representing 
pairs of countries that speak a common language or have other historical ties. 
The dependent variable is trade (exports plus imports), in log form, between 
pairs of  countries in a given year. Our data source is the United Nations trade 
matrix, which covers sixty-three countries in our data set, so that there are 
1,953 data points (= 63 X 62/2) for a given year. In the regressions reported 
here, we use data for 1970, 1980, and 1990. 
A large part of the apparent bias toward intraregional trade is certainly due 
to  simple geographical  proximity.  Krugman  (1991b) and  Summers (1991) 
opine that mosr of it may be due to proximity. (At the other extreme, Bhagwati 
[1993] and Panagariya [1995,9-101  assert that very little of  the apparent bias 
is due to proximity, emphasizing rather regional trade arrangements that are 
already in place.) Surprisingly, empirical studies often neglect to measure this 
factor. Our measure is the log of distance between the two major cities (usually 
the capitals) of  the respective countries. We also add a dummy ADJACENT 
variable to indicate when two countries share a common land border. 
The other of the most important factors in explaining bilateral trade flows is 
one that we have already identified as the essence of the gravity model: the 
2. The results of one extensive early project along these lines were reported in Tinbergen (1962, 
appendix 6, pp. 262-93)  and Linnemann (1966). Recent empirical  studies include Bergstrand 
(1989), Wang and Winters (1991). and Hamilton and Winters (1992). 
3. It has long been considered that the classical Heckscher-Ohlin theory of  comparative advan- 
tage does not have this property. Deardorff (chap.  1 in this volume), however, now argues that the 
gravity relationship can also be derived from the Heckscher-Ohlin model as well as the imperfect 
substitutes model. The proportionality between trade and the product of GDPs is also a property 
of our theoretical model introduced in section 4.3. Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995) includes a more 
detailed exposition of how our model offers improved foundations for the gravity model, in that 
the effects of both size and distance are derived. 95  Continental Trading Blocs: Are They Natural or Supernatural? 
economic size of the two countries. In addition to the well-established effect 
of size on trade, there is reason to believe that GDP per capita has a positive 
effect on trade, for a given size: as countries become more developed, they 
tend to specialize more and to trade more. Finally, LANG is the dummy vari- 
able reflecting a common language. 
The equation to be estimated is thus 
log (Trade,,) = a + P,log (GNPtGNPJ)  + P,  log (GNP/pop,GNP/pop,) 
(1)  + P3  log (DlSY,)  + P,  (ADJACENT,) + P,  (UNG,,) 
+ Y,  (EC,)+ Y2 (WY,)  + Y3 (EAIJ)  + u,,. 
The last five explanatory factors are dummy variables. EC, WH, and EA are 
three of the dummy variables we use when testing the effects of  membership 
in a common regional grouping, standing for European Community, Western 
Hemisphere, and East Asia, respectively. We  will estimate average intraregio- 
nal biases over 1970-90,  and possible trend increases in the biases. 
Table 4.2 reports pooled time-series-cross-section estimates of equation (1) 
that extend from 1970 to 1990. All gravity variables are highly significant sta- 
tistically (>99 percent level). The coefficient on the log of  distance is about 
-0.5,  when the ADJACENT variable (which is also highly significant statisti- 
cally) is included at the same time. This means that when the distance between 
two nonadjacent countries is higher by  1 percent, the trade between them falls 
by  about 0.5 percent. We checked for possible nonlinearity in the log-distance 
term, as it could conceivably be the cause of any apparent bias toward intraregi- 
onal trade that is left after controlling linearly for distance, but this did not 
seem to be an issue!  We  should note that physical shipping costs may not be 
the most important component of costs associated with distance. What we call 
transport costs would better be understood as transactions costs, encompassing 
not just each physical transportation of goods, but also costs of  communica- 
tions and the idea that each country tends to have a better understanding of its 
close neighbors and their institutions. 
The estimated coefficient on GNP per capita is 0.23, indicating that richer 
countries do trade more.5 The estimated coefficient for the log of  the product 
of  the two countries’ GNPs is about 0.7, indicating that, although trade in- 
creases with size, it increases less than proportionately (holding GNP per cap- 
4. The log of distance appears to be sufficient; the level and square of distance add little. We 
have also tried distance measures that take into account the greater distances involved in sea voy- 
ages around obstacles like the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn (the data generously supplied 
by Wang and Winters), with little effect on the results. 
5.  We have also tried an estimate for 1991 using GNPs adjusted by purchasing power parity, in 
place of using exchange rates to translate GNPs. The coefficient on GNP/capita is 0.35, with little 
qualitative change in  the estimates otherwise. (The sum of the coefficients on GNP and GNP/ 
capita is about  1. Thus there is another, approximate way  to describe the results: openness [as 
measured by trade/GNP] falls by 0.23 percent for every 1 percent increase in size [as measured 
by population] .) 96  Jeffrey A. Frankel, Ernesto Stein, and Shang-Jin Wei 
Table 4.2  Gravity Estimation of Continental Trade Blocs (total trade 1970-90) 
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Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables except the intercepts and dummy variables 
are in logs. Trend = Year -  1970. 
*Significant at the 1% level. 
ita constant). This presumably  reflects the widely known pattern that small 
economies tend to be more open to international trade than larger, more diver- 
sified economies. 
The linguistic dummy, LANG, represents pairs of countries that share a com- 
mon language or had colonial links earlier in the century. We allowed for En- 
glish, Spanish, Chinese, Arabic, French, German, Japanese, Dutch, and Portu- 
guese. Two countries sharing linguistickolonial links tend to trade roughly 60 
percent  more  than  they  would  otherwise  (exp  (0.47)  =  1.60). We  tested 
whether some of  the major languages were more important than the others, 
and found little in the way of significant differences. 97  Continental Trading Blocs: Are They Natural or Supernatural? 
4.2.2  Estimation of Trade-Bloc Effects 
If there were nothing to the notion of trading blocs, then the five basic vari- 
ables in table 4.2 might soak up most of the explanatory power. There would 
be little left to attribute to a dummy variable representing whether two trading 
partners are both located in the same region. In this case the level and trend in 
intraregional trade would be due solely to the proximity of the countries, and 
to their rates of overall economic growth. 
We found, however, that all three regional dummies are statistically signifi- 
cant. The coefficient for the EC dummy is 0.3 1. This means that over the period 
1970-90,  two EC countries traded 36 percent (exp (0.31) = 1.36) more than 
two otherwise similar countries. As is indicated by the EC-time-trend  inter- 
active term in the second column, the within-EC bias increases at the rate of 
about 0.6 percent a year, although this trend is not statistically significant. Av- 
eraged over time, the intra-Western  Hemisphere trade bias is of the same order 
of magnitude as the EC. But it started out low in 1970 (in fact, negative), and 
increased over time at the rate of 6 percent a year. This relatively rapid trend 
increase is statistically significant. By  1990, two Western Hemisphere coun- 
tries  traded  150 percent  more  than  two  otherwise-similar  countries  (exp 
[-0.323  + (20 X 0.063)] = 2.55). The East Asian grouping exhibits the high- 
est intraregional bias. Intra-East  Asian trade, however, once we have controlled 
for the gravity variables, shows no significant increase in bias over the period. 
If  anything, this  bias diminished  over time, rather  than rising,  as often  as- 
sumed.' 
In table 4.3, we employ a dummy for all of Western Europe, instead of con- 
sidering the EC bloc alone. The motivation is to treat the European continent 
on a par with the other  The intraregional bias for Western Europe  is 
slightly smaller than that for the EC. The coefficients for other variables in the 
specification are essentially unchanged. 
We have conducted more robustness checks in addition to those that have 
been mentioned earlier. Chapter 7 of this volume tests the effect of bilateral 
exchange rate variability  on trade,  and the effect of the degree of openness 
(more trade with all countries, as distinct from more trade just with other mem- 
bers of  the grouping). Other extensions that we tried include allowing a role 
for differences in factor endowments as additional regressors, a correction for 
6. In other words, the rapid growth of East Asian economies is in itself sufficient to explain the 
increase in the intraregional trade share evident in table 4.1. This finding, that intraregional trade 
bias in Asia did not rise in the  1980s as often assumed, confirms Frankel (1993). Petri (1993), 
Saxonhouse (1993),  and Anderson and Norheirn (1993). 
7. Some readers are less interested in the effects of three continental blocs than of explicit FTAs, 
like the EC and NAFTA. The effects of such subregional blocs are estimated in Frankel, Stein, and 
Wei (1995).  (The results suggest that regionalization in the Western Hemisphere during 1980-90 is 
concentrated in the Andean Pact and Mercosur groupings. The NAFTA grouping is not statistically 
significant in this sample period.) 98  Jeffrey A. Frankel, Ernesto Stein, and Shang-Jin Wei 
Table 4.3  Gravity Estimation, Western Europe instead of European 
Community (total trade 1970-90) 
Dependent Variable: log (Trade,,) 
Intercept  -9.771  -9.89* 
(0.28)  (0.28) 
1980 dummy  -  1  .oo*  -  1.04* 
1990 dummy  -  1.28*  -1.33* 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
GNP  0.73*  0.73* 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
Per capita GNP  0.22*  0.23* 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
Distance  -0.50*  -0.50* 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
Adjacency  0.72*  0.72* 
(0.10)  (0.09) 
Common language  0.47*  0.48* 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
Western Europe bloc  0.21*  0.w 
(0.06)  (0.08) 
East Asia bloc  2.12*  2.29* 
(0.09)  (0.19) 
Western Hemisphere bloc  0.32*  -0.29* 
(0.09)  (0.10) 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
Western Europe*Trend  -0.015* 
(0.004) 
East Asia*Trend  -0.015 
(0.012) 
Western Hemisphere*Trend  0.061* 
(0.009) 
Observations  4555  4555 
Standard error of  regression  1.15  1.14 
Adjusted R’  0.76  0.76 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables except intercepts and dummy variables are 
in logs. Trend = Year - 1970. 
*Significant at the 1% level. 
heteroscedasticity related to the size of the countries (weighted least squares), 
and the inclusion of country pairs recorded with zero trade. The answers to the 
question of interest here, the estimates of  the intraregional biases, are fairly 
robust to these variations. 
The gravity model results thus show that, on average over 1970-90, the three 
regions did exhibit inward trade bias. The next question is whether these biases 
constitute an undesirable threat to the world trading system. 99  Continental Trading Blocs: Are They Natural or Supernatural? 
4.3  The Theory of Bilateral Trade with Imperfect Substitutes and 
Transport Costs 
We now attempt to settle the Krugman versus Krugman controversy regard- 
ing the desirability of trading blocs. We construct in this section a more general 
model that can handle the intermediate realistic case where transport costs be- 
tween  continents are less than  infinite, while greater than  zero. Section 4.4 
derives the implications of  this model for trading blocs. Section 4.5 aims to 
match up the theory of sections 4.3 and 4.4 with section 4.2’s empirical esti- 
mates of the effects of  transport costs and regional trading arrangements on 
the volume of bilateral trade, in order to evaluate the welfare implications of 
regionalization of the world economy. 
4.3.1  The Differentiated Products Model 
We employ a monopolistic competition model similar to Krugman (1980), 
who in turn followed Dixit-Stiglitz. A representative consumer has the utility 
function 
where c, is the consumption of  the ith variety. This utility function results in 
preference for variety by consumers. The higher the parameter 8, the lower the 
love for variety. In  the limit of perfect substitutability, 8 = 1. In the limit of 
complete love for variety, consumers care only about the number of varieties 
consumed, and not at all about the quantity: 8 = 0. 
Labor is the only factor of production. The total national supply of labor is 
L. Increasing returns are introduced by assuming a fixed cost and a constant 
marginal cost in the production of each of the varieties. We assume that indi- 
vidual firms maximize profits, and free entry assures a zero-profit equilibrium. 
Under these simple assumptions, the scale of output of each variety does not 
depend on the size of the economy. Rather, it is the number of varieties n that 
increases when the size of the economy (15)  increases: 
(3) 
~(1  -  8) 
n= 
a 
where a is the parameter representing the fixed costs of production of a new 
variety. Notice that in the case of very low substitutability (as 8 tends to 0), the 
number of varieties produced approaches Wa,  and an infinitely small amount 
of each of them is produced, since consumers care only about the number of 
varieties available.* 
To see the gains from international trade, which arise here from the opportu- 
8. Details of  derivations are given in Stein and Frankel (1994) 100  Jeffrey A. Frankel, Ernest0 Stein, and Shang-Jin Wei 
nity to consume a greater variety of goods, we assume that countries have simi- 
lar tastes and technologies. If we have two countries of equal size, allowing for 
unfettered trade will double the number of available varieties in each country 
and thus raise utility. The gains from trade have nothing to do with differences 
in factor endowments or technology. 
Deardorff and Stern (1994) question the realism of  this setup. In their view, 
the Krugman result that a few large blocs are worse than many small ones can 
be attributed to excessive emphasis on the utility of consuming a large variety 
of goods that may differ only in the location of production (i.e., brand name). 
In a model based on comparative advantage, they show how FTAs formed by 
a few dissimilar countries can yield welfare levels that are very close to those 
under free trade. They  suggest that  the emphasis on love for variety  in the 
monopolistic competition model overstates the trade-diversion effect, leading 
to an overly pessimistic view of FTAs. An unfortunate limitation of their model 
is the assumption of prohibitive tariffs between countries that do not belong to 
the same bloc. As Haveman (1992) shows, the addition of optimal tariffs to a 
comparative-advantage-type  model results in welfare effects similar to those 
of Krugman’s product-variety model. 
We  believe that the product-variety approach is relevant, since it helps ex- 
plain an important and increasing portion of world trade, in particular in manu- 
factures. This is reflected in the increase in intraindustry trade as a proportion 
of total trade. Ideally, one would like to come up with a model where gains 
from trade are explained both by  comparative  advantage and by increase in 
variety. (This avenue of research is explored by Spilimbergo and Stein in chap. 
5 of this volume.) In the meantime, we think both the comparative advantage 
and the product variety  models help to illustrate  some of  the effects of  the 
formation of trading blocs, and are useful in their own right. 
4.3.2  Introduction of Transport Costs and Tariffs 
We will think of the world as being divided into a number of  continents (C), 
each of them equidistant from one another. Each of these continents is com- 
posed of  a number  of  countries  (N>. The transportation  system we assume 
within each continent is a hub-and-spoke network. In each continent there is a 
hub, through which all trade involving that continent must pass. Each hub has 
N spokes, all assumed of equal length, connecting it to the N countries in the 
continent. 
Transport costs will be assumed to be of Samuelson’s iceberg type, which 
means that only a fraction of the shipped good arrives; the rest is lost along the 
way. The cost of transport through two spokes will be represented as a,  while 
that of transport from hub to hub (across the ocean) is given by b, where 0 I 
a, b 5  1. Trade involving two countries on the same continent will have to be 
transported  from the exporting  country  to the hub, and from the hub to the 
importing  country. This involves  two spokes, and so the fraction of  a good 101  Continental Trading Blocs: Are They Natural or Supernatural? 
shipped that arrives at the market is 1 -  a. Similarly, the fraction of  a good 
that amves in the case of trade between countries in different continents, which 
involves two spokes and a hub-to-hub section, is (1 -  a)(  1 -  b). 
When a consumer buys a foreign good, the government levies an ad valorem 
tariff t.  We assume that the tariff is levied on the c.i.f. price.9 The level of tariffs 
is exogenous and assumed to be uniform  across countries, representing the 
most-favored-nation  (MFN) principle, until  we are ready to examine FTAs. 
Tariff receipts are returned to the consumer as a lump-sum transfer. 
For simplicity, we will assume that the countries are equal in size. The sym- 
metry of the model now assures that producers'  prices are the same in every 
country. The same is true of the number of varieties and the quantity of each 
variety produced in every country. 
Prices of  home and foreign goods faced by home consumers are different 
due to transport costs and tariffs. If the producer prices in every country are p. 
then the price the domestic consumer will have to pay for every unit of foreign 
good consumed would be 
(4) 
where the subscript c refers to goods imported from within the continent, and 
nc otherwise (across continents). The corresponding tariffs imposed on the two 
types of foreign goods are t, and t,,. 
It is useful to fix some more notation here. The situation in which there are 
no continental trade blocs and every country charges the same positive tariff 
on goods from all other countries (MFN) can be represented by t, = t,,, = t > 
0. Global free trade is described by  tc = tnC = 0. Finally, the case of every 
continent forming an FTA is characterized by t, = 0 but t,,, = t > 0. 
The next step is to derive from the utility function the consumption of each 
foreign variety (both from neighbor countries and from countries in other con- 
tinents), relative to the consumption of each home variety. We begin with the 
MFN case t, = t,,, = t > 0. 
For ease of exposition, we will index goods in such a way  that the home 
country produces varieties  1, . . . ,  n;  neighbors produce varieties n + 1, . . . , 
n + n'; and countries across the ocean produce varieties n + nc + 1, . . . , 
n + nc + nnc.  The home consumer maximizes 
n+n(-+nnc 
u= c  c," 
t=l  (5) 
subject to the budget constraint 
9. Is.,  tariffs are a proportion of the value of the good including transport costs, in terms of  the 
iceberg model. This assumption is simpler, and probably more realistic as well, than letting tariffs 
be levied on the f.0.b. price. 102  Jeffrey A. Frankel, Ernest0 Stein, and Shang-Jin Wei 
where w  is the wage and Tis  the lump-sum transfer received by each consumer, 
which they regard as being fixed. 
From the maximization problem of the consumers it is possible to derive the 
elasticity of demand for exports faced by the producers, which turns out to be 
E,  = 1/(1 -  O), the same as the elasticity of domestic demand. The equality 
of these elasticities guarantees that the price resulting  from the firm's  profit 
maximization  is the same as in the case of the closed economy. So are the 
quantity produced of each variety and the number of varieties n produced in 
each country. Transport costs and tariffs thus introduce  no changes in  these 
variables. But the key point is the effect on consumption patterns. 
The first-order conditions for the consumer's problem yield the relative con- 
sumption of each variety: 
(7) 
and 
where cf  and c:  are the domestic consumer's consumption of foreign varieties, 
from countries within the continent and across the ocean, and cf  is the domes- 
tic consumer's consumption of the home varieties. 
4.3.3  Welfare Implications of Trade Agreements 
To evaluate world welfare, we derive the utility of a representative individual 
in any country. To determine the utility of the consumer, we need to know how 
much he or she consumes of  each good, and introduce these values into the 
utility function. Equations (7) and (8) above give us the consumption of foreign 
relative to home varieties, so we need only to determine the consumption  of 
each home variety, cf.  We do this by expressing the budget constraint in terms 
of c:, and taking into account the redistribution of the tariff revenue to con- 
sumers. 
If we normalize p to be 1, we can obtain, after some algebra, 
(9)  cf = 
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where E = 1/(1 -  6), and w/n = 6c;u/Lp(  I -  ,).I"  Once we have the consump- 
tion of domestic varieties, the consumption of foreign varieties can be obtained 
from the relative consumption equations (7) and (8). Replacing  these in the 
utility function, we obtain the value of the utility of the representative indi- 
vidual: 
Given values for the parameters  a, b, t, 6, N, and C,  we can first obtain the 
value of c: by plugging the price equations (4) into (9), substitute into (7),  (8), 
and (lo), and thus find the value of the utility of the representative individual, 
which is our measure of world welfare. 
Equation  (10) is the expression  for utility  in  the  absence of  free trade 
agreements. It is straightforward to calculate utility under other arrangements 
in the same manner. When trading blocs are formed, we just introduce the new 
set of  relative prices faced by  the home consumers into their maximization 
problem, and we can obtain new values for utility in a similar way. 
4.4  Welfare Effects of Continental Trade Blocs 
We have presented a model that allows us to analyze the desirability of dif- 
ferent trade  arrangements from a world  welfare perspective,  as well as the 
changes associated with these different arrangements in terms of the bilateral 
volume of trade between countries. In the absence of transport costs, our model 
is reduced to Krugman's model (1991a). That is, we obtain a U-shaped welfare 
curve as a function of the number of trade blocs. For plausible values of param- 
eters, a system of three or so trade blocs is the worst outcome. We now use the 
model with transport costs, to examine the desirability of trade blocs formed 
along continental lines. 
In our first exercise, we explore the desirability of forming natural and un- 
natural trading blocs as a function of transport costs. In particular, in this appli- 
cation we look at FTAs, where the intrabloc tariffs are completely eliminated. 
In our second exercise, we analyze the implications of what could be consid- 
ered an intermediate degree of regionalization, a partial movement toward the 
creation of (natural) FTAs, and compare it to the outcome associated with a 
full movement  in that direction.  We  allow for the formation  of preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs) that differ from the FTAs  in that the tariff  level is 
reduced among partners, but not necessarily eliminated. Even though it is tech- 
nically prohibited by article XXIV, many existing regional arrangements are in 
fact partial. We will show that a partial movement toward regional integration, 
as in the case of PTAs with preference below 100 percent, is usually superior 
10. This last equality can be derived from equation (3) together with the profit maximization 
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to a complete one, associated with FTAs.ll At the same time, this application 
illustrates the need for a more complete characterization of trading blocs, one 
that goes beyond the naturalhnnatural distinction. 
Throughout, we consider only exercises involving symmetric formation of 
equal-sized blocs around the world. Deardorff and Stern (1994) and Srinivasan 
(1993) have taken exception to the symmetric logic of  Krugman’s bloc ques- 
tion. We, like Krugman, do not address here the asymmetric partial equilibrium 
exercise of examining the effects of  forming a single bloc in one part of the 
world, particularly the effects on countries unfortunate enough to be left out of 
any bloc.I2 The motivation,  as we see it, is to address the desirability of  the 
international regime with respect to blocs worldwide, that is, article XXIV. It 
is of course true, however, that variation in GNPs across countries, if nothing 
else, renders the real world an inherently asymmetric place. 
4.4.1  Transport Costs and Free Trade Agreements’ Welfare Effects 
In this application, we study how the effect of the formation of continental 
free trade agreements on welfare depends on intercontinental transport costs. 
Thus we are able to fill in the realistic intermediate case between Krugman’s 
polar cases of zero and infinite intercontinental transport costs. We  start with 
the simple case where the world consists of three continents comprising two 
countries each. Transport costs within continents, u, are for simplicity assumed 
to be zero in the simulations reported here. 
Figure 4.1 shows the percentage change in welfare associated with the for- 
mation of trading blocs, both of  the natural and unnatural type, for 8 = 0.75 
and t = 0.3.13  We can see that there is a critical level of intercontinental trans- 
port costs b, which governs the welfare effects. For the case of natural trading 
blocs, where each country forms a bloc with its neighbor, the critical value of 
b is 0.186: for values of b higher than this, the formation of  continental FTAs 
will result in improvements in welfare. (Remember, in the limiting Krugman’s 
case where b = 1, natural blocs are necessarily welfare-improving.) For lower 
values of b, continental FTAs would reduce welfare. (Remember the limit case 
where b = 0.) As noted in the introduction, we label such welfare-reducing 
arrangements “supernatural blocs,” to indicate that intercontinental transport 
costs are not high enough to justify the formation of FTAs even along the lines 
of geographical proximity.I4 
11. Admittedly, the usual pattern in practice is not to reduce tariffs partway on all goods. Rather, 
agreements tend to exempt certain “sensitive” sectors from liberalization, which raises extra prob- 
lems of distortions and rent-seeking behavior that are not considered here, but that constitute valid 
arguments in favor of article XXIV. (Less worrisome is the tendency for agreements to phase in 
tariff cuts gradually over time.) 
12. This question is considered, however, by Stein (1994). 
13. Some sensitivity analysis with respect to these and other parameters is reported in Frankel, 
14. When tariffs are assumed to be levied on f.0.b. instead of c.i.f. values, the critical value of 
Stein, and Wei (1995). 
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Notes: 0 = 0.75; t = 0.3; a = 0;  N = 2; C = 3. 
Welfare effects of blocs: natural, unnatural, and supernatural 
Unnatural trading blocs, where each country  forms a bloc with one other 
country outside the continent, result in distinctly lower welfare for small values 
of 6. Krugman’s idea  (1991a)  that  natural  trade  arrangements have a better 
chance of improving welfare than arrangements between unnatural partners is 
thus confirmed. 
4.4.2  Allowing for Preferential Trade Agreements 
In this application,  we take another look at trading blocs of the “natural” 
kind (among neighbors), but we will allow for the formation of  PTAs, that is, 
partial  liberalization.  To  do this,  we  need  to  modify  our  model  slightly. 
The tariff level between partners, instead of zero, will now be (1 -  k)t,  where 
0 5 k 5 1, and k is the degree of preference for intrabloc trade or the degree 
of  intrabloc  liberalization.  The price of  partner  varieties faced by  domestic 
consumers becomes 
P  [1 + (1 -  k)tI 
P< = 1-  a 
Until now we were considering only the two special cases of k = 0 (MFN, 
or the absence of trading blocs) and k = 1 (FTAs). Now we consider the whole 
range of possible levels of intrabloc preference. We will begin as in the previ- 
ous application, with a world that consists of three continents, each formed by 
two countries. 
What level of intrabloc preference maximizes welfare? Figure 4.2 shows the 
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Fig. 4.2  Effects of preferential trade arrangements 
Nofes:  9 = 0.75;  f  = 0.3;  a = 0; C = 3;  N  = 2. 
of b.Is This figure is closely related to figure 4.1. There we were comparing the 
welfare levels associated with the two extremes of k = 0 and k = 1 for every 
possible level of  intercontinental transport cost b. For b < 0.186, figure 4.1 
indicates that the formation of FTAs along natural  regional lines is welfare- 
reducing (supernatural). In figure 4.2, this translates into a higher welfare level 
for the MFN or no-preference extreme (k = 0)  relative to the opposite endpoint 
of full continental FTAs (k = 1) forb = 0.1. 
The important thing to notice in figure 4.2 is that, for every level of intercon- 
tinental  transport  costs, the  degree  of  intrabloc  preference  associated  with 
maximum welfare  is between 0 and  1. In general, PTAs with  less than  100 
percent preferences are superior to FTAs. This confirms a conjecture by Meade 
(1955). The key to this result is the diminishing marginal utility for the con- 
sumption of each variety. The intuition is easier to understand under zero trans- 
port costs, where trade policy does not affect total consumption. Under MFN, 
households will consume the same amount of every foreign variety, but a larger 
amount of the home varieties. Imagine that the formation of FTAs entails suc- 
cessive small reductions of intrabloc tariffs. With the first reduction, trade di- 
version has a small welfare effect, since there is a shift between varieties that 
were consumed in similar quantities. But trade creation effects are large, since 
home varieties (with smaller marginal utility) are replaced by member varieties 
(with larger marginal utility). Thus, a small reduction in intrabloc tariffs start- 
ing from MFN will improve welfare. The opposite is true for the last reduction 
of intrabloc tariffs. Under FTAs, the consumption of member and home varie- 
15. For each set of parameter values in the figure (transport cost and O), welfare is normalized 
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ties is the same (in the absence of transport costs), while the consumption of 
other foreign varieties is lower. In this case, the welfare effects of trade creation 
are negligible, while  trade diversion has a larger effect, since varieties  with 
larger marginal utility  (those from other foreign countries) are replaced  by 
varieties from member countries, which have smaller marginal utility. 
Figure 4.3 provides another way  of looking at this issue. For the set of pa- 
rameters  chosen, it represents  all possible  combinations  of  intercontinental 
transport cost b and intrabloc preference k. (As in the other graphs, we only 
show b up to 0.5 here, under the reasoning that transport costs higher than 
50 percent are not plausible.) The solid line represents the level of intrabloc 
preference that maximizes welfare at each level of transport cost b. Below this 
line, there are positive returns to regionalization, that is, in this range increas- 
ing the degree of preference will result in higher welfare. Above this line, in- 
creases in the preference are welfare-reducing. We call this the area of negative 
returns to regionalization, NRR. 
Within the NRR area, the dotted line represents, for every level of interconti- 
nental transport cost, the intrabloc preference level that yields the same welfare 
as k = 0 (i.e., MFN). The trade arrangements that lie above this dotted bound- 
ary are the ones we call “supernatural”  trading blocs. The term “natural” does 
not seem appropriate to describe trade arrangements that, even when formed 
along the lines of  geographical proximity, represent a movement so deep to- 
ward regionalization  that  welfare is reduced  compared  to the no-bloc  situ- 
ation.  l6 
16. The supernatural bloc area does not always exist. For certain values of  the parameters-for 
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For b = 0.10, our base-case parameter values, and  a world consisting of 
three continents of  two countries each, NRR set in when preferences are 49.5 
percent. Any greater degree of regional preference moves into the zone of NRR 
(figures 4.2 and 4.3). For this world, 87.6 percent preferences put the economy 
into the supernatural zone. 
In reality, the status quo that should be compared to continental blocs is a 
world that contains more than two countries (or FTAs) per continent. We have 
repeated the experiment for the more realistic, if  still stylized, case where the 
world consists of  four continents of  sixteen countries each. This sixty-four 
country  setup has the virtue of corresponding roughly to our gravity-model 
data set examined in section 4.2. (We could get to four continents by  adding 
the MideadAfrica group of countries to the other three.) NRR set in sooner 
than before. If  intercontinental transport  costs are 0.2, then the world attains 
the welfare optimum as soon as intrabloc preferences reach  10.4 percent, and 
enters the supernatural zone when they reach 20.4 percent.”  If intercontinental 
transport costs are only 0.1, then NRR set in even sooner. For a world con- 
sisting of four sixteen-country continents, the optimum degree of continental 
preferences is 7.6  percent, and the supernatural zone begins at 14.8 percent. 
We  now  return  to  figure  4.1,  to  look  at  the  welfare  effects  of  trade 
agreements, this time not only allowing for less than 100 percent preferences, 
but also assuming the world trade system chooses the preference level opti- 
mally.lX  (We return, for the moment, to a hypothetical world of three continents 
consisting  of  two  countries  each.)  The “optimal  PTA”  curve  shows  up  as 
welfare-improving  no matter what the intercontinental transport  costs are. It 
makes a big difference if the preferences are set at the optimal level, rather 
than the 100 percent level that is called for in a true FTA. 
This application, together  with the last one, has provided  some answers, 
within the limitations imposed by the structure of our model, to what Bhagwati 
( 1993) calls the static-impact-effect question regarding the creation of trading 
blocs. Starting from the absence of  trading blocs, a small movement  in the 
direction of  increased regionalization (by increasing intrabloc preference) is 
always a good thing. We can say that there are positive returns to regionaliza- 
tion  up to the point of  maximum  welfare, and NRR thereafter.  If intrabloc 
preferences are set at the optimal level, regionalism will have an immediate 
nents-welfare  under FTAs is higher than welfare under thc MFN rule for every value of transport 
cost h. This eliminates the possibility of  “supernatural” blocs. (An earlier footnote noted some 
sensitivity analysis with respect to the parameters. In general, thc higher 8 and t, the less likely 
blocs will be “supematural.” In addition, the higher R and r, the higher the optimal preference level 
k for every level of transport cost b, which translates into a smaller area corresponding to negative 
returns to regionalization.) 
17. If tariffs are levied on the f.0.b. value, the weltare optimum occurs when intrabloc prefer- 
ences are as low as 27.0 percent, and enters the supernatural zone when they are 5 1.5 percent. 
IS. This “optimal” level is not the result of a Nash noncooperative equilibrium, where each bloc 
chooses the optimal preference level given the preference level chosen by  the rest of  the blocs 
(and given the tariff level t).  It is just the preference level that maximizes welfare in a symmetric 
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positive effect on world welfare. If  trade blocs are constrained to have  100 
percent preferences (as in article XXIV in GATT), then world welfare could be 
made lower, assuming transport costs are relatively low and there is sufficient 
preference for variety. 
From  the  purely  static viewpoint  of  our  model,  100 percent  preference 
within a trade bloc is not optimal. Does this mean that GATT should eliminate 
article XXIV’s requirement that FTAs stipulate complete liberalization? Not 
necessarily. We think that article XXIV can probably be rationalized in a dy- 
namic political-economy framework. The ultimate goal is the achievement of 
global free trade. The requirement of article XXIV may be the best “dynamic 
time-path” (Bhagwati 1993) to achieve this goal. An explicit political-economy 
model that would be helpful for this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.19 
4.5  Some Estimates of Intercontinental Costs to Evaluate the Extent 
of Regionalization 
Where does the current pattern  of trade regionalization lie in the welfare 
spaces mapped out above? To answer this question, it would be useful to obtain 
estimates of the key parameters, especially that of intercontinental transport 
costs, b. In this section, we make an audacious attempt to do this. We cannot 
claim any precision to the estimates, but hope that the exercise is instructive. 
Perhaps the most natural place to look for an estimate of b is the difference 
between the c.i.f. value of a country’s trade and its f.0.b. value as a percentage 
of its total trade. One disadvantage here is that the data are not comprehen- 
sively available on a bilateral basis. Another disadvantage of using aggregate 
c.i.fJf.0.b. numbers is that they depend on the composition of trade (which is 
in turn influenced by the true transport costs). 
If  we were willing to leave aside these deficiencies,  we could proceed  as 
follows. The ratio of total worldwide import values, including insurance and 
freight costs, to export values in 1990 was about 1  .06.20  Assume that 6 percent 
is  a  weighted  average  of  intracontinental  costs  and  intercontinental  costs: 
0.06 = ZCS a + (1 -  ZCS)(a + b -  ab),  where ZCS  is the fraction of the world 
trade that is between countries on the same continents. In our sample, the ratio 
of intracontinental to total  trade, ZCS,  is roughly 0.4. Without  knowing the 
value of parameter a, we cannot get an exact estimate of 6.  But we can infer a 
rough upper bound: b = (0.06 -  ZCSa)/[(l -  ICS)(l -  a)] -  a/[l -  a] 5 
0.06/(  1 -  ZCS)  = 0.06/( 1 -  0.4) = 0.10. Even if the intercontinental transport 
cost takes this upper bound, we observe from figures 4.1 and 4.3 that supernat- 
ural trading blocs are a real danger. 
However, there is reason to think that the 10  percent estimate could in fact 
19.  A country that joins an FTA  may then experience an increase in political support for further 
20. In 1980 it was 1.066 and in 1989, 1.053 (UNCTAD 1991, table 36). 
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be too low. Although the parameter b is labeled as “intercontinental transport 
cost” in the model, we  noted earlier that it  should represent all transaction 
costs pertaining to intercontinental trade (other than trade barriers imposed 
by governments). Certain costs such as those associated with personal contact 
between buyers and sellers are not captured well by  the c.i.fJf.0.b. ratio. Re- 
cent literature on spillovers and geographic concentration suggests that the ef- 
fects of proximity on stimulating production are much greater than mere trans- 
port costs. In the classic gravity model of  world trade, Linnemann (1966) 
concluded that the effect of distance on trade comes from three channels rather 
than one: (1) transport costs, (2) the time element (involving concerns of per- 
ishability, adaptability to market conditions, irregularities in supply, and inter- 
est costs), and (3) “psychic” distance (which includes familiarity with laws, 
institutions, and habits). 
If  we  were willing to assume that the observed tendency for countries to 
trade with neighbors was the result solely of  these proximity-related aspects 
that we wish to measure, and not of preferential trading policies, the parameter 
b could be estimated in a simple way  from the data on intraregional trade 
shares, within the confines of our theoretical  Such an estimate of b is, 
however, almost certainly overstated. We  know from our gravity estimation 
that statistically significant tendencies toward regional trade preferences al- 
ready exist, and thus explain part of  the proclivity toward intraregional trade 
that shows up in table 4.1. 
For this reason, our preferred approach is to infer the value of  b based on 
estimates of elasticities in our gravity regression. This approach holds constant 
for the effects of  regional trading arrangements already in existence, as well 
as the effect of per capita GNPs, common languages, and so forth. 
We  combine several pieces of  information. First, in the algebra in section 
4.3,  the  elasticity  of  demand,  E,  = dlog (Trude)/dlog  (P), is  given  by 
1/(1 -  0). Second, in our sample, the mean distance between countries on 
the same continent is 2,896 kilometers, and on different continents is 11,776 
kilometers-four  times as great. If transport costs show up fully in the price 
facing the consumer, the percentage change in price associated with being lo- 
cated on a different continent is given by  (p,,/p,) - 1 = b/(l -  b).  This fol- 
lows from equation (4). Third, this price effect, or b/(  1 -  b),  should be approx- 
imately equal to 
dlog (Trade)/dlog (DZST) 
d  log (Trade) ld log (P) 
1.403  dlog  log (1  1,776/2,896) = 
d log (DZST) 
= [0.50(1-O)]  1.403. 
21.  Krugman  (1991b) and  Summers (1991), for example,  use  simple calculations  to infer 
roughly the importance of distance in determining trading patterns, without explicitly allowing for 
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Choosing again our baseline value 0 = 0.75, our sample calculation suggests 
that intercontinental transport costs are roughly on the order of  15 percent 
(= 0.175/1.175). It is interesting to note that this estimate is indeed greater 
than 10 percent, the rough estimate implied by the c.i.fJf.0.b. data.**  The esti- 
mate  for b, together  with  our simulations, suggests that  continental FTAs 
would put us firmly over the line into the supernatural zone. 
What about PTAs? If  taken at face value, the estimate of b = 0.15 together 
with figure 4.3 suggests that the optimal degree of preferences within a conti- 
nental grouping, k*, is roughly 55 percent in a stylized six-country world. In 
other words, intraregional trade barriers should be lowered to 45 percent of the 
level of  worldwide barriers. When  intrabloc preference proceeds past  that 
point, it enters into the zone of negative returns to liberalization. For the more 
realistic sixty-four-country world, NRR set in as early as at 9 percent prefer- 
ences and the supernatural zone at around 18 percent preferences. 
The last step is to try to extract from our gravity estimates of section 4.2 a 
measure of k, the degree of preferences prevailing in existing regional trading 
blocs. If  we take our point estimates in column 2 of  table 4.2 at face value, 
they suggest that the EC in 1990 operated to increase trade among its members 
by roughly 43 percent (exp (0.245 + (20 X 0.0057)) = 1.43). Other parts of 
the world have varying intraregional biases. Let us ask the hypothetical ques- 
tion, what would the effect be on world economic welfare if the trading system 
settled down to an array of continental blocs that each had the same level of 
preferences as the EC? 
Let the percentage effect on trade of  bloc formation be represented by  y. 
Using our model in section 4.2, a bit of algebra reveals that the formation of a 
bloc with preferences of  k lowers the prices of  goods in intrabloc trade by 
-tk/(l  + t).  The ratio of the change in quantity to the change in price is equal 
to the elasticity of demand: 
=Ex=  1/(1 -  0). 
tk/(l + t) 
Solving for the parameter we wish to estimate, 
k = y(i + t)(l -  q/t. 
Taking y = 0.43 from the EC estimate, 0 = 0.75, and t = 0.30, the implied 
estimate of k is 0.47. In other words, in this illustrative calculation, EC prefer- 
ences operate to reduce trade barriers by  47 percent for intrabloc trade. This 
parameter value  is  not  far  from  the  optimum  for  our three-continent six- 
country world, but lies in the supernatural zone for our more realistic four- 
continent sixty-four-country world. It follows, within the assumptions of  our 
model, that if  all continents followed the EC example, the regionalization of 
22. It is also, as expected, lower than the estimate following the Krugman-Summers approach. 112  Jeffrey A. Frankel, Ernesto Stein, and Shang-Jin Wei 
world  trade  would be excessive,  in  the  sense  that world  economic  welfare 
would be reduced relative to the MFN norm. 
The tentative conclusion of this study is that some degree of preferences along 
natural continental lines, such as a Western Hemisphere PTA or enlargement 
of the EC into a European economic area, would be a good thing, but that the 
formation of FTAs where the preferences approach  100 percent would repre- 
sent an excessive degree of regionalization of world trade, within the confines 
of  our static economic model. The overall conclusion is that the world trading 
system is currently in danger of entering the zone of excessive regionalization. 
The optimal path to liberalization apparently features a sharp departure from 
article XXIV. It entails reducing intracontinental barriers partway, for example 
by only an estimated 10 percent or so. The strategy of concentrating on reduc- 
ing trade barriers at the multilateral level before (or at the same time as) liberal- 
izing completely within any one continental trading arrangement appears un- 
der our assumptions to be preferable. 
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Comment  Paul Krugman 
A warning to any economist who works in applied theory: your models may 
have real consequences. You  may find yourself at the head of a large move- 
ment. You  may  say to yourself, “This is not my movement”;  you may say to 
yourself, “My God, what have I done?’  But there it is. 
When I wrote down a stylized model of the consequences of regional trading 
blocs a number of years ago-a  model that was intended to provide a language 
for discussing the competing hopes and fears regarding such blocs, rather than 
to be a basis for serious policy analysis-I  did not expect to launch a sublitera- 
ture. But in a way it should not be surprising that papers that take off from that 
original, almost tongue-in-cheek effort (either building on the original model 
or, with considerable justification, calling the whole approach into question) 
should have become a minor academic industry, and even have begun to have 
some influence on actual policy discussions. After all, a model-even  a crude, 
small, somewhat silly model-often  offers a far more sophisticated, insightful 
framework for discussion than scores of judicious, fact-laden, but model-free 
pontifications. But while worrying too much about realism can be a very bad 
thing-there  is nothing worse than the would-be wise man who knows all the 
facts but has no sense of how they might fit together-it  is also always a bit 
worrying  when very simple models are made to bear too much weight. One 
always wants to stand back and ask whether the  simplicity of the model is 
missing too much. 
Now I found this paper by Frankel, Stein, and Wei  completely admirable. 
Not only does it develop a very clever way to take account of the role of geogra- 
phy in influencing the impact of trade blocs; it makes ingenious use of econo- 
metric results to make the model, if not exactly empirical, at least constrained 
by  statistical evidence. I would never have thought one could get so far with 
this general approach. Moreover, this paper is part of  a very important wider 
project by the authors, which has turned the classic gravity approach to trade 
modeling into a tool of policy-oriented research in a way nobody had thought 
of before. 
So I have no criticisms. I do, however, have two observations. 
The first, minor concern is one of  practical  relevance. When I first wrote 
about trading blocs, it was an item of faith among many commentators that 
regional  trade  liberalization  was the  wave  of  the  future-that  the  political 
success  of  the  European  Single  Market  and  the  Canada-U.S.  Free  Trade 
Agreement would soon be matched by  a series of regional integrations. Mean- 
while the multilateral system was regarded as being in desperate straits-those 
were the days when Lester Thurow’s pronouncement that “the GATT is dead” 
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was taken very seriously by world leaders. But that was a long time ago. Since 
then, the Uruguay Round has been successfully passed, albeit in more modest 
form  than  originally  hoped.  And  meanwhile,  regional  trade  liberalization, 
while  it has  continued,  has proved  to be  far more difficult  politically  than 
people had imagined. Maybe  I  can summarize this  briefly by  saying that a 
ninth GATT round these days seems more plausible to  me than an extension 
of NAFTA to include Brazil or an extension of the European Economic Area 
to include Ukraine. If there is to be a world of regional trading blocs, it seems 
likely at this point that it will at the very least involve some distinction between 
the advanced-country cores and developing-country peripheries  within  each 
bloc. This, too, could be modeled; a crucial question would then be the division 
of gains within each bloc between core and periphery. 
My second, more analytical concern is with the way Frankel, Stein, and Wei 
map the theoretical model onto the real world. In their conclusion that actual 
regionalization may well be “supernatural,” they make use of stylized worlds 
in which there are several continents consisting of a number of countries-for 
example, a world  of  four continents of  sixteen countries each. At first this 
seems more or less right-if  one counts North and South America as a single 
unit, there are indeed four major inhabited continents, with close to a hundred 
national units among them. But there is a crucial assumption  in the model 
that is not nearly true of the real world: that countries themselves are of equal 
economic size. In  reality, of  course, the size distribution of GDPs is highly 
unequal, and this surely makes a major difference when we try to model the 
effects of integration. 
How should this be accommodated within the model? One answer would be 
to put the real size distribution of countries into the analysis. In a way, however, 
the whole point of this style of model is to assume away asymmetries among 
countries, so as to avoid the mind-numbing taxonomies of customs-union the- 
ory. This suggests that we might instead try to loosely deal with the unequal 
size of nations by using, not actual numbers, but some index of the number of 
“country-equivalents”-say  the inverse of a Herfindahl index. 
If we do this, the picture of the world is strikingly different. I recently made 
an estimate of the number of country-equivalents, using the inverse of the sum 
of squares of world GDP; while this index has risen over time, with the erosion 
of  U.S. dominance, there are still fewer than  ten country-equivalents in the 
world economy as a whole. Exactly how this observation should be mapped 
into the model is arguable, but I would suggest that a world of three continents 
with three “countries” each is in some sense closer to the truth than the version 
the authors actually use. 
In  the end, of  course, one cannot avoid the asymmetries. Regional trade 
liberalization will not have the same effects on the United States and Mexico, 
on Germany and Estonia. It was always a distorting assumption to imagine that 
we could  suppose otherwise; but  this  paper shows that the assumption has 
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Comment  T. N. Srinivasan 
The revival of interest in regional preferential trading arrangements (RPTAs) 
in the late eighties after the failure of  many  such arrangements  (except the 
European Community [EC] and the European Free Trade Association) in the 
past was in part triggered by the fear that the ongoing Uruguay Round of multi- 
lateral trade negotiations would fail and the global trading system would end 
up in a few trading blocs. Surprisingly, even after the successful conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round with the signing of its Final Act by countries in April 1994 
and the establishing of the World Trade Organization in January 1995, the in- 
terest in RPTAs has not only not disappeared but has gathered further momen- 
tum. Countries in the Western Hemisphere, members of the Asia-Pacific Eco- 
nomic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), and others have agreed to remove all barriers to trade among them- 
selves in the next two decades. Whether RPTAs are stepping stones or stum- 
bling blocks in the path toward a liberal global trading system continues to be 
debated. It is being suggested that the proposed RPTAs differ from those in 
the past in that they go far beyond border measures and cover ostensibly trade- 
related but domestic policies as well. Nonetheless, a convincing case has yet 
to be  made  as to  why  removal  of  such  policy  distortions  is feasible  only 
through regional approaches. 
The implication of the formation of a customs union (CU), free trade area 
(FTA), or more generally an RPTA for the welfare of the residents of member 
and  nonmember nations  has been  a central analytical issue for economists, 
starting with Jacob Viner. A concern for the welfare of nonmembers can be 
seen in article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
1947, on CUs and FTAs. It requires in part that barriers to trade of nonmembers 
should not go up whenever a CU or FTA is to be formed with a waiver from 
GATT’s most-favored-nation  (MFN) principle. One of the central propositions 
of the analytical literature is that associated with Kemp and Wan (1976), who 
showed (using a standard neoclassical  general-equilibrium  setup) that there 
exists a common tariff structure for a CU consisting of any arbitrary number 
of countries, which ensures that no consumer outside the union is made worse 
off and at least one consumer within the union is better off compared to the 
preunion global equilibrium, as long as lump-sum transfers among consumers 
within the union are feasible. Thus a path ending in global free trade consisting 
of successive enlargements of CUs, each enlargement being Pareto noninferior 
to the preceding one, exists in the Kemp-Wan world. Of course, whether a CU 
in the real world satisfies the Kemp-Wan condition is another question. Two 
more recent propositions established by Krugman (1991a, 1991b) for a world 
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of many identical countries are that, in the absence of transport costs, the num- 
ber of trading blocs that minimizes global welfare is two or three; however, in 
a world of identical countries located in continents separated by almost prohib- 
itive transport costs, continental trading blocs are welfare-improving because 
such blocs create trade among members  without diverting trade  away from 
nonmembers. 
The paper of Frankel, Stein, and Wei is in two, in effect unrelated, parts, the 
first consisting of a simple econometric analysis of actual bilateral trade flows, 
and the second of numerical analysis from a stylized model that is a generaliza- 
tion of the Krugman setup. In the first part, bilateral total trade flows among 
sixty-three countries for 1970, 1980, and 1990 are put through the well-known 
gravity model but with a few additional explanatory variables (apart from dum- 
mies for the years 1980 and 1990) such as dummies for adjacency of the coun- 
tries, membership in regional country groupings (EC or Western Europe, East 
Asia, and Western Hemisphere) and, in one version, separate time trends for 
each country group as well. The authors find that all three regional dummies 
are positive and statistically significant, so that any two countries within any 
one of the groups traded significantly more with each other than with two oth- 
erwise similar countries that are not within the same region. The authors view 
this as indicating a pronounced “regional bias” in trade. Since distance, adja- 
cency, and so forth have been controlled for and, except for the EC, the other 
two regions were not formally a trading bloc during the period covered by the 
data set, I would argue that the coefficient of regional dummies, like that of any 
other dummy (or should I say “dumb”) variable, merely assigns a quantitative 
magnitude for ignorance! In other words, for reasons that are not known and 
hence not captured in the explanatory variables, such as GNP, distance, and so 
forth, two countries within a region trade more with each other by a percentage 
indicated by the magnitude of the coefficient of the dummy.’ The effect of the 
formation of a trade bloc is not the coefficient of the regional dummy, but the 
change in it in separate regressions before and after the region formally be- 
comes a trade bloc.* 
Interestingly, a time trend interacting with the regional dummy is signifi- 
cantly positive in the case of Western Hemisphere and significantly negative in 
the case of Western Europe. In the Western Hemisphere, however, the positive 
trend is so strong that it offsets the negative coe~cient  of the regional dummy 
(i.e., a bias away from trade within the region) in about five years, whereas in 
1. The authors conclude from the fact that EC dummy is 0.31, for example, that any two EC 
countries trade 36 percent (exp (0.3  I) = 1.36) more than two otherwise similar countries. Strictly 
speaking, since the estimated coefficient for large samples is normally distributed, its exponential 
is log-normally distributed. Now, if X  is log-normally distributed, i.e., if log X is normally distrib- 
uted with mean p,  and variance uZ,  then EX = E[exp log x] = e*+(’lZio2.  Frankel, Stein, and Wei 
have ignored the %u2  term and as such underestimate the “regional bias”! I should also add that, 
since measured GNP, GNP per capita, and distance contain errors relative to their true values, the 
estimated regression coefficients are biased. The authors do not recognize this. 
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the case of Western Europe, a positive coefficient of regional dummy (i.e., a 
bias in favor of regional trade) is almost eliminated by  the negative trend. The 
authors do not comment on this. Be that as it may, the short empirical section 
based on gravity model does not help in understanding the reasons for regional 
bias,  if  any,  or its welfare implications for each region  or those outside the 
region. As such, it does not have much to contribute to explaining the current 
enthusiasm for RPTAs and to the debate about its consequences for multilater- 
alism. 
Let me turn to the stylized model and numerical analysis based on it. I can- 
not emphasize enough that the model is extremely special: countries are identi- 
cal, an identical number (N) of them are located in each of a number (C)  of 
continents. The transport cost (measured in terms of the Samuelson iceberg- 
melting coefficient) between  any two countries  within  any  continent  is the 
same and that between any country in any continent and any country in any 
other continent is also the same. All countries produce varieties (with costless 
product differentiation) from a continuum of possible varieties using the same 
technology that requires a fixed cost in terms of labor (the only factor of pro- 
duction) as well as a constant marginal cost, again in terms of labor. Labor is 
identical in productivity everywhere and is inelastically supplied. Consumers 
anywhere have the  same utility  function that is the sum of the utility  from 
consuming each variety, which is assumed to be a constant elasticity function 
of consumption. Market structure is of monopolistic competition of the large 
group with free entry.’ Of course, almost by definition all models are stylized 
representations of a complex reality. But a robust model is one that simplifies 
inessential details of  the real world. As I  argue below, the Krugman model, 
while robust for analyzing some aspects of trade, is not so far the case that 
Frankel, Stein, and Wei make of it. 
Initially all countries have the same tariffs on all imported varieties, whether 
from a country within or outside their continent. In all experiments, the authors 
consider only symmetric formation of equal-sized blocs around the world. In 
the first experiment, there are three continents with two countries each, with no 
transport cost within continents. “Natural” blocs are continental blocs, while 
“unnatural” ones involve countries  in two different continents. The welfare 
effects depend on the level of intercontinental transport costs. If they are suffi- 
ciently low, FTAs along “natural” blocs are welfare-reducing. For even lower 
level of transport costs, unnatural blocs are welfare-reducing. This is consistent 
with Krugman’s first proposition. 
3. Presumably this model due to Krugman is by now so familiar that the authors do not state all 
its technology, taste, and market-structure assumptions! Because of  this, one is likely to miss the 
facts that their normalization of number of varieties, price of each variety, and the wage rate to be 
unity implies relationships between technology and taste parameters and the labor endowment and 
is dependent  on the extreme symmetry of  the model. I am not  sure that this normalization is 
innocuous, except, possibly, in the “symmetry” case: after all, in a model with scale economies, 
the size of the economy (here, the size of the labor endowment) matters. For example, if countries 
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In the second experiment, within each bloc there is only partial liberalization 
in the sense that the tariff applicable to imports from a country within the bloc 
is a proportion of the tariff applicable to imports from outside. Unsurprisingly 
it turns out that, given any level of intercontinental transport cost, the optimal 
margin of preference for imports within a “natural” bloc is strictly above zero 
so that a preferential  trading arrangement  is welfare superior to a fiee trade 
arrangement within a bloc. The authors view this finding as implying that the 
requirement of GATT article XXIV that all trade within a CU or FTA be free 
is inappropriate, though they recognize there are other political-economy con- 
siderations for the requirement. The “optimal”  margin of preference is shown 
to be an increasing function of the intercontinental transport costs, so that wel- 
fare increases  (respectively  falls) as regional  preference  increases  from any 
level below (respectively above) the optimal level. If the regional preference 
margin is increased sufficiently above the optimal level, welfare falls below its 
no-trading-bloc (i.e., regional preference margin of zero) level. 
The authors make what they appropriately term an “audacious attempt” to 
obtain estimates of their key parameters in order to find out whether the current 
pattern of regionalization has gone beyond the welfare-improving range. Quite 
rightly they do not claim any precision to their analysis, while concluding that 
“within the assumptions of our model . . . if  all continents followed the EC 
example, the regionalization  of world trade would be excessive, in the sense 
that world welfare would be reduced relative to the MFN norm.” 
It should be obvious that the authors’ model is extreme not only in its sym- 
metry but also in the assumption that all trade is based on preference for vari- 
ety, market structure is of the Chamberlinian monopolistic competition of the 
large group with free entry, and transport costs are of the iceberg-melting vari- 
ety. Indeed, the last assumption (and the assumption that tariffs are ad valorem) 
ensures that the price gross of costs of transport and tariffs is proportional to 
the price net of such costs, so that the relevant demand price elasticities (as 
perceived by each producer) are unaffected. Because of unchanging price elas- 
ticities, producer decisions, in particular production-level producer prices and 
number of varieties produced, are unafected by tariffs or transport costs. Cer- 
tainly the extreme  symmetry  and other assumptions  make it easy to derive 
analytically the global equilibrium and numerically simulate the comparative 
statics. However, whether the simulations are more than illustrative of the pos- 
sibilities is arguable. I am not convinced that the simulations are enough to 
conclude, even tentatively, that “some degree of preferences along natural con- 
tinental lines, such as a Western Hemisphere PTA or enlargement of the EC 
into a European economic area, would be a good thing, but that the formation 
of FTAs where the preferences approach 100 percent would represent an exces- 
sive degree of regionalization of  world trade.” To be fair, the authors refer to 
other works in which the symmetry assumption is relaxed to a limited extent 
and comparative advantage considerations are introduced, with some signifi- 
cant  differences  in  their conclusion. But robust  policy  conclusions have to 
await less stylized and more realistic and empirically grounded analyses. 120  Jeffrey A. Frankel, Ernesto Stein, and Shang-Jin Wei 
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